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Still, Georgia is poised to lead the conference in scoring, improve 8+ points in scoring defense, and has fixed most of the special teams non-sense from the last four seasons. Bobo has done his best job yet in scheming, game planning, and coaching his players. Pruitt has done a good job with the players he thought weren't ready for his style of defense. Richt and his staff have done a stunningly good job of maximizing what this team can be.
And that is what is so maddening. The two losses in conference were due to coaches not doing what it takes to win the game, as opposed to worrying about not losing. Richt, despite the fake kicks, going for it on fourth down, and breaking out trick plays, still, at inexplicable times, grasps onto the don't screw up mentality. The squib/pooch kick was just one example of that.
At this point, Mark Richt still can't recognize how to step into a situation where if things go wrong there isn't really that big a difference, but if they go right, there is a huge payoff. The key lesson here is to be clear on the difference between probability and consequence. The corollary to that is making decisions where things could go wrong, but aren't likely to do so.
Call it Les Miles'ing. Les Miles really gets the distinctions noted above. And he wins games because of it. While it drives LSU fans crazy, and he definately carries it too far at times, he recognizes both the value in making decisions that carry more benefit when the lower risks dictate it, and know where things can go wrong, but aren't likely to do so.
The difference is easily illustrated in the Tech game. Think about the series with the fake FG. Brilliant call. At worst we likely give up an average of 10 yards of field position to a team that, at that point, we were handling well. At best, we score a TD on the play, and nearly did. Georgia ended up not getting into the end zone and taking a FG. Why go for a FG there? We are averaging nearly 4ypc inside opponent's 20 and are completing 66% of our passes inside the red zone. If you are willing to risk turning the ball over to Tech at their 30, why not risk the same from their two in exchange for 4 more points, and so much more momentum?
Same goes for the pooch kick. The payoff of kicking it deep is they have a long field against a higher possibility (though still low) of a TD return. By pooching it, you nearly eliminate the chance of a TD return, but substantially increase the chances of getting the ball into FG position.
In both kicking the FG inside the three and the pooch kick, Coach Richt was trading the possibility of something bad happening for the immediate payoff of controlling of what happens, though with that control you are giving up a high payoff, and oftentimes one that has a much higher probability of happening than the bad thing happening. In poker parlance, he is checking down a winner, even though knows he is holding winner and his opponent is drawing to a one or two outer.
This manifests itself in the bigger picture from our past reliance on the Gray hound for four years, consistently fair catching punts anywhere deeper our own 40. Or punting inside opponent territory on 4th down in short yardage situations. Or going for FGs inside the opponents 10. Richt has shed some of that super conservative, don't mess up pathology, definitely picked up from being at FSU when Bowden showed some of the biggest riverboat gambling tendencies in the game. He still reverts to it too often.
Mark Richt has done a good job over the past few seasons of recognizing where he needs to change to 'take the next step.' It remains to be seen if he can do so with a much harder to recognize and easily fixable hole in his coaching game.
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Mark Richt has done a good job over the past few seasons of recognizing where he needs to change to 'take the next step.' It remains to be seen if he can do so with a much harder to recognize and easily fixable hole in his coaching game.
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